Autocratic Legalism Kim Lane Scheppele Upd Access

: Use the mandate to pack courts and capture the legislature. Neutralizing Checks

Rather than a Schmittian sovereign dictating outside law, autocratic legalism declares emergencies (migration, pandemic, terrorism) and then converts emergency powers into ordinary, permanent law.

Perhaps Scheppele's most hopeful contribution in recent years is her emphasis on transnational law as a tool for democratic restoration. In her 2024 Annual Review article and in various lectures, she has highlighted the primary role that transnational courts play in transforming individual rights into constitutional structures that safeguard democratic institutions. From judicial independence to presidential term limits, transnational courts are reshaping the legal landscape in the fight against autocratic legalism.

To remain in office indefinitely, the regime modifies election parameters without outright banning opposition parties. Tactics include: "Autocratic Legalism" by Kim L. Scheppele - Chicago Unbound

How do you think should respond when a country remains "legal" on paper but undemocratic in practice? autocratic legalism kim lane scheppele upd

First, Some scholars argue that Scheppele’s framework risks labeling any aggressive, partisan use of legal power as “autocratic.” If a democratic majority packs a court (as FDR threatened), is that autocratic legalism? Scheppele answers with a distinction of entrenchment versus policy . FDR wanted to change policy; Orbán wanted to change the ability of future majorities to ever change policy again . The latter is autocratic legalism; the former is constitutional hardball within a still-competitive system.

This is often mistaken for the Rule of Law. However, as noted in the Verfassungsblog analysis of Scheppele's work, it is actually , where the law is used to subvert constitutionalism rather than uphold it.

: Because the leader is popular, many citizens view the dismantling of institutions as "cleaning up" a corrupt or slow-moving "old system."

The defense against autocratic legalism requires international pressure, strong civil society, and the swift action of supranational courts (e.g., the European Court of Justice) to deem legalistic reforms invalid under higher constitutional principles. Conclusion: The Continued Relevance of Scheppele in 2026 : Use the mandate to pack courts and capture the legislature

Mechanisms and toolkit of autocratic legalism

A dramatic illustration of how autocratic legalism continues to evolve within the EU came in January 2026. Hungary granted political asylum to Zbigniew Ziobro, Poland's former Minister of Justice under the PiS government, who was facing criminal investigations in Poland for alleged abuses committed during his tenure. A Verfassungsblog analysis called this "a textbook example of autocratic legalism"—legality deployed not to protect rights, but to shield power and dismantle mutual trust from within. By modifying its surrender rules to shield recognized refugees from extradition, Hungary set aside Treaty-level constraints designed to prevent precisely such uses of asylum. The case reveals how autocratic legalist tactics are becoming increasingly sophisticated, using legal procedures not merely to consolidate power at home but to create transnational safe havens for allied illiberal actors.

Between 2010 and 2014, Orbán’s government enacted a new constitution (the Fundamental Law), reduced the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction over fiscal matters, slashed the retirement age for judges from 70 to 62 (dismissing nearly 300 judges at once), installed a pro-government media council, and rewrote election rules to entrench the majority. Every step was legally taken. No tanks rolled. Yet by 2014, Hungary was no longer a liberal democracy.

As of the mid-2020s, autocratic legalism is no longer a niche concept. It has appeared in amicus briefs before the U.S. Supreme Court, in European Parliament resolutions, and in the strategic litigation of civil society groups from Warsaw to Brasília (where Jair Bolsonaro’s administration showed clear autocratic legalist patterns). Scheppele’s framework has been cited in testimony on Hungary before the U.S. Helsinki Commission and in the European Commission’s rule-of-law reports. In her 2024 Annual Review article and in

Because these laws are formally enacted through constitutional procedures, they possess a "cloak of legitimacy" that makes them difficult to challenge at home or abroad.

The rise of autocratic legalism poses significant threats to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Some of the dangers include:

earned her J.D. and Ph.D. (in anthropology) from the University of Chicago. She taught at the University of Michigan and then at the University of Pennsylvania Law School for a transformative period from 1998 to 2005, where she was the Stephen A. Schiller Professor of Law and a key figure in the interdisciplinary Law & Society movement. During those years, she wrote foundational work on constitutional identity, emergency powers, and Central European transitions—work that directly foreshadowed autocratic legalism.

For students, activists, and scholars typing “autocratic legalism kim lane scheppele upd” into search bars late at night, the answer awaits in her formidable corpus: begin with Autocratic Legalism (2018), then read The Rule of Law and the Eurocrisis (2015), then the Hungary and Poland chapter in the Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law. But also read the dissents—the judges fired in Budapest, the professors investigated in Warsaw, the civil servants purged in Ankara. Their stories are the data points. Scheppele gave us the regression line.

Kim Lane Scheppele, a professor of sociology and international affairs at Princeton University, has pioneered the study of this phenomenon, coining the term What is Autocratic Legalism?